

# The State of Civil Society Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians

August 2024

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# Acknowledgments

We could not be more appreciative to the brave Israelis and Palestinians who wake up each day working to create a better reality. Thank you to the peacebuilders for agreeing to share your stories and heartbreak, and for allowing us to learn from you and share your work.

Thank you to Amitai Abouzaglo for doing the research for this report – meeting with dozens of peacebuilders, creating data points from their stories, analyzing that data and helping turn it into meaningful and actionable insights. Thank you to our founding donors, the Aviv Foundation and Sally Gottesman, who supported us in writing the 2020 report, “**The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding**,” which became the foundation for our programs and this report. Thank you for continuing to support us as we grow. Thank you to all of our donors, supporters, and partners who enable us to do this work every day.

Thank you to Shaul Judelman for inspiring the Diamond Approach; I learned a lot from the way you handled so many crises. Thank you to Sam Bayer, Richard Dale, and Nancy Strichman for your perspective, reframing, and support. Thank you to Lisa Schaubé for designing diagrams for the Diamond Approach and the Pathway to a Nonviolent Construct, and for helping us code the findings and analyze the data. Thank you to B8 of Hope and ALLMEP for connecting us to NGOs, reading through the draft, and sharing your thoughts before we publish our findings.

Thank you Basheer Abu Baker for creating Amal-Tikva with me, a dream we scribbled together on a napkin almost five years ago. Thank you to the rest of the Amal-Tikva staff: Ghadeer Sabat-Kort, Ariel Markose, Amitai Abouzaglo, Sewar Uthman, and Natasha Voloshin, for showing up every day with all your heart and backbone, especially in the hardest times. Thank you to the Amal-Tikva board of directors and Friends of Amal-Tikva, Inc. You are our lifelines, our advisors, our guides, and our friends. We couldn't do any of this without you.

And of course, thank you, Zack, for supporting me on this crazy journey in the most insane time. Thank you to my kids – Shalva, Yishai, Yona, and Aviya – for being my source of inspiration.

I seek to create a better reality for you, your children, and your children's children.

All my best,

*Meredith*

Meredith Rothbart  
Co-Founder and CEO, Amal-Tikva

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## About Amal-Tikva

Amal-Tikva seeks to build capacity for sustainable and scalable peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians. We know that the shortcomings of peacebuilding efforts have many roots, so we offer a comprehensive range of programs to ensure that all stakeholders are equipped to lay the foundation for a better reality. We are committed to working top down, bottom up, and side-to-side, as long as participants seek to be real, strategic, and committed to impact. Since our founding in 2019, we have been working mostly at the NGO, donor, and academic levels to support developing sound theories of change rooted in strategic thinking and best practices.

It is important to note that we are a local, Jerusalem-based NGO with Israeli and Palestinian staff and lay leaders. We are not an independent research institute, but rather an active member of the field we seek to serve. Learn more at [www.amal-tikva.org](http://www.amal-tikva.org)

## Endorsements

"The events of October 7 have reignited the debate surrounding peace civil society organizations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, questioning whether they serve as agents of change or merely perpetuate the status quo. This renewed scrutiny has thrust us into a critical narrative battlefield, where the true impact and intentions of these organizations face intense examination. According to Amal-Tikva, despite the harsh realities of the conflict, these civil society organizations display remarkable resilience and strategic acumen, positioning themselves to reclaim and redefine the narrative. Their efforts underscore an indispensable role in the pursuit of just and inclusive societies."  
- *Farah Bdour, Programs Director at the Amman Center for Peace and Development, and a member of the Middle East Partnership for Peace (MEPPA) Advisory Board*

"The field of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding is actually more resilient than we could have imagined.' This is one of the essential and heartwarming findings of the Amal-Tikva survey. As peace philanthropists closely working with 'the field,' we knew it. Yet this survey shows that it was not just our gut feeling but actually a reality. Working and uniting for a shared future is possible. Peace-builders and change-makers who experience the conflict firsthand and strive to pave a path for peace need our help and support from abroad more than ever."  
- *Mehra Rimer, Co-Founder and Executive Director, B8 of Hope*

"Amal-Tikva's research arrives at a critical moment for everyone who cares about a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The shocking events of October 7, the ensuing war and its devastation of Gaza represent some of the darkest moments in Israeli-Palestinian history. The community of peacebuilders that are evaluated in this report not only stand in opposition to the violence, dehumanization, and horror of this war; they are also a core and prerequisite component of any realistic strategy to escape this nightmare, and will be at the vanguard in any process that can deliver equality, security, and peace to both peoples. As such – and with the stakes so high – knowing the strengths, weaknesses, trends, and developments within the field is essential if it is to fulfil its true potential. Amal-Tikva's report helps us better understand many key variables. It is essential reading for all those who want to play a part in furthering Israeli-Palestinian peace."  
- *John Lyndon, Executive Director, ALLMEP - The Alliance for Middle East Peace*

# Forward

*By Joel Braunold, Managing Director of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, and Chairman of the Board of Friends of Amal-Tikva Inc.*

Never has a field been more stereotyped, maligned, misjudged, and critiqued than the peacebuilding field working within the context of Israel and Palestine. Peacebuilders are the butt of jokes, the enemy of maximalists, and are often seen as naive fools.

As the latest report of Amal-Tikva shows, the funhouse mirror of lazy analysis is anything but true. The field is self-reflexive, understands its role, knows where it can make a difference, and what it needs to do so. The field is not nice; it is necessary. It is a field that understands that it is not on its shoulders alone that a system can shift, but that its efforts can contribute to systemic change that so many are seeking.

Contrary to common assumptions, peacebuilding activities did not stop on October 7 despite the field being over-represented among the victims of the October 7 attack and subsequent war. The NGOs have shown signs of growth and development necessary to survive the new hostile environment and its challenges ahead. The field is self-aware that it doesn't have all the solutions, and it is at this departure point that Amal-Tikva's reflections on where the field must go become so imperative.

Amal-Tikva challenges the field to deepen their roots in their own respective societies which have been further torn apart since October 7. The field can only lead if it acknowledges that they themselves are part of the warring parties and their strength comes from being in deep relationship with their own communities, even as they maintain relationships with the 'other.' As Marty Linsky and Ronald Heifetz teach in adaptive leadership, "leadership is the art of disappointing your community at a rate they can accept." You can't run too far ahead or allow them to get too comfortable in societal norms that are exacerbating tensions, but must find the path to keep moving them into spaces, activities, and opportunities that slowly transform their realities without shattering their identities.

What makes this report unique is that it takes a systems view, examining not just the NGOs surveyed but also the funding environment, overarching societal dynamics, and the role of the international community. If only the other segments of the system were as keen on self-reflexive learning as the NGO community, we would all be in a better place.

This report can serve as a guide for activists, donors, diplomats, and interested parties on what the reasonable expectations for the peacebuilding field are and how to get from here to there. Ultimately, for the grassroots to grow, they need the correct resources as their foundation, and the space, attention, and ambition from above to weather the storms and evolve in an ever increasingly hostile environment. As we all seek to find a roadmap to how to help Israeli and Palestinian society reach a better place, we would do well to reflect on the data and insights gleaned from those who work tirelessly every day to try and transform the situation for the better.

# Definitions and Acronyms

**Anti-Normalization:** The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic & Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) defines ‘normalization’ as participation in any initiative, in Palestine or internationally, that brings together Palestinians and Israelis without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation. The anti-normalization movement is known for actively disrupting peacebuilding efforts and for publicly shaming and threatening participants and supporters.

**Beneficiary:** A person, persons, or community that receives support from an NGO program.

**Binational:** A group that includes participants who are Israeli Jews and also Palestinians, whether the Palestinians are citizens of Israel or residents of Jerusalem, the West Bank, or Gaza.

**Civil Society:** A term that refers to the overall sector of not-for-profit (NPOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists, and institutions working to improve life for the general public.

**Cross-Border:** In the context of this report, ‘cross-border’ refers to work that primarily engages Jewish Israelis and Palestinians from Jerusalem, the West Bank, and/or Gaza.

**Impact:** The outcomes and results expected from your work over time. Defining impact answers the question, “If we are successful, what will be different in our community in the long term?”

**Key Players:** Political, religious, diplomatic, or community leaders that influence the way society thinks, feels, believes, and/or should behave.

**MEPPA:** The U.S. Congress enacted the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA) in 2020 to advance peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians to enable a sustainable two-state solution. MEPPA establishes two funds and authorizes up to \$250 million over five years. To learn more about MEPPA: <https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa>

**NGO:** Non-governmental organizations, also referred to as non-profit organizations, not-for-profit organizations, civil society organizations, and community organizations.

**Peacebuilding:** Amal-Tikva defines ‘peacebuilding’ as working to create a more peaceful reality for Palestinians and Israelis, characterized by less hatred, tension, and violence; an increased quality of life; and improved systems for interaction. Amal-Tikva does not define peacebuilding as preparing civil society for a future political peace agreement, but rather as taking concrete steps to make lives better now.

**Scale:** Non-profit organizations use the phrases ‘scale up’ or ‘go to scale’ in order to describe the expansion of their interventions’ capacity to reach larger populations and generate increased impact. “This scaling process most commonly involves implementing the intervention at new sites or expanding the capacity of existing sites to serve a larger number of participants.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "Six Steps to Successfully Scale Impact in the Nonprofit Sector." The Evaluation Exchange, Harvard Family Research Project. See: <https://archive.globalfrp.org/evaluation/the-evaluation-exchange/issue-archive/current-issue-scaling-impact/six-steps-to-successfully-scale-impact-in-the-nonprofit-sector>.

**Shared Society:** The term ‘shared society’ refers to activities that promote peacebuilding between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel and the investment in Israeli Arab citizens' educational, economic, and social welfare in the State of Israel.

**Spoiler:** A person, persons, or group that obstructs or prevents productive steps toward a peace process.

**Strategy:** Making decisions that serve to further overarching goals by channeling all efforts in the same direction.

**Uninational:** A group that includes participants who are either only Israeli Jews or only Palestinians, whether the Palestinians are citizens of Israel or residents of Jerusalem, the West Bank, or Gaza.

**USAID:** The international development agency of the United States government, seeking to advance U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrate American generosity, and promote a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience. To learn more about USAID: [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)

**Zero-Sum:** A situation in which an individual or group gains at the expense of another. In the context of two parties, the gain of one party comes at the expense of the other. Zero-sum is the opposite of mutual benefit or a ‘win-win’ scenario.

# Executive Summary

## Overview

Well before October 7, prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians were discouraging. While large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians were already convinced that the other side was not trustworthy, a dwindling minority supported the two-state solution<sup>2</sup>. At Amal-Tikva, we have always hypothesized that if NGOs, donors, experts, and activists worked strategically and collaboratively to change the zero-sum nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then the conflict would feel more resolvable to the most relevant stakeholders, which is a key first step toward building a just and lasting peace.

This report seeks to take that hypothesis one step further by a) analyzing the state of civil society peacebuilding organizations after October 7, and b) making recommendations about the role civil society can and should play in creating a sustainable and less violent 'Day After.' The organizations from which we collected data continue to pursue a better future for Israelis and Palestinians, even as their employees and beneficiaries are directly affected by the ongoing bloody and traumatizing war. In the following pages, based on our findings, we make the case for the essential role civil society peacebuilding organizations can and should play through their work on the ground and through close coordination with decision-makers inside their societies. Our recommendations stem from a combination of the data, our experience on the ground, and other research cited in the footnotes.

## Key Findings

Our findings are based on one-hour-long interviews conducted with the leaders of 38 NGOs between January 21, 2024, and April 3, 2024, as well as insights gained from our experience in the field since the fall of 2020. Data collected from our 2020 report, "[The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding](#)," is also utilized in order to observe how the field has changed from 2020 to 2024. Twenty-five of the 38 NGOs surveyed in 2024 were also surveyed in our 2020 report.

**FINDING #1: The field of civil society peacebuilding has gained capacity and become more strategic since 2020.**

### Quantitative findings:

- Budget sizes have increased and funding has become more diverse.
- Staff sizes have grown since 2020 and remained stable since October 7, 2023, and the current Israel-Gaza war.
- NGO leadership has become more diverse and teams have become more equal between Israelis and Palestinians.

### Qualitative observations:

- The NGOs are demonstrating resilience and a trend toward becoming more impact-focused, rooted in a sound theory of change. We see this outlined in Finding #3 in their ability to continue to resume operations and programs effectively during the current crisis.
- This is also evident in their perceptions of the challenges to their work. In our 2020 survey, NGO leaders said their biggest challenges were a lack of funding, an inability to find staff,

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<sup>2</sup> Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, January 2023. [https://resolution.tau.ac.il/sites/socsci-english.tau.ac.il/files/media\\_server/resolution/Summary%20Report\\_%20English\\_Joint%20Poll%2024%20Jan%202023.pdf](https://resolution.tau.ac.il/sites/socsci-english.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/resolution/Summary%20Report_%20English_Joint%20Poll%2024%20Jan%202023.pdf)



and difficulty recruiting participants. The top challenges reported in the 2024 survey were (1) successfully implementing organizational strategy and (2) staff capacity to implement that strategy. This shows a shift in the mindset of the NGOs from a) blaming external resources for a lack of success to b) focusing on ensuring their ability to achieve their objectives.

**FINDING #2: The Israelis and Palestinians involved in civil society peacebuilding efforts—as activists, beneficiaries, and program participants—have been widely affected by the ongoing war.**

- The pain and suffering experienced by Palestinians and Israelis throughout the ongoing war cannot be captured in statistics. Yet, it is notable that the staff and participants dedicated to civil society peacebuilding are not working at a distance from the war but are instead in the vulnerable position of being affected directly by it.
  - Bereaved Families: Three out of 38 organizations reported that one or more staff members lost a relative in the war. Fifteen out of 38 organizations reported that one or more beneficiaries lost a relative in the war.
  - Displacement: Eight out of 38 organizations reported that one or more staff members were displaced due to the war. Twelve out of 38 organizations reported that one or more beneficiaries were displaced due to the war.
  - Reserve Duty: Nine out of 38 organizations reported that one or more staff members were called to reserves due to the war. Eleven out of 38 organizations reported that one or more beneficiaries were called to reserves due to the war.
  - Restricted Movement: Fifteen out of 38 organizations reported that one or more staff members were affected by restricted movement due to the war. Twenty-six out of 38 organizations reported that one or more beneficiaries were affected by restricted movement due to the war.
- **Even before October 7, contacts with Palestinians in Gaza among civil society peacebuilding organizations were few.** The risks of cross-border contacts with Israelis were high for Palestinian Gazans, and civil society in Gaza suffered severe political repression<sup>3</sup>. Despite this, five NGOs surveyed in 2024 worked directly in Gaza or employed someone residing in Gaza before October 7.
- The majority of NGOs we surveyed are binational organizations in staff and outreach. Most binational NGOs work in both Shared Society & Cross-Border contexts and continued to operate within the first few months of the war, as outlined in Finding #3.
- **FINDING #3: Civil society peacebuilding NGOs demonstrated organizational resilience in the face of trauma as well as capacity to stay strategic.**
- The majority of programs across NGOs either continued or were launched during the first six months of the war, and overall, their teams have been stable.
- Whether staff, volunteers, or lay leaders of NGOs, those deeply affected by the conflict and ongoing war are continuing their efforts to build a better reality.
- Within the first six months of the war, 40% of surveyed NGOs (15 organizations) delivered aid to people in need, indicating that they had the staff, financial, and strategic capacity to pivot and invest in a new element of their work.

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<sup>3</sup> Members of the Gaza Youth Committee, which made contacts with Israelis for the purpose of advocating for nonviolence and reconciliation, were imprisoned by Hamas officials in 2020. For more information: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/world/middleeast/peace-activists-convicted-gaza.html>

- The majority of NGOs (57%) have been reaching out to new communities, engaging with beneficiaries and stakeholders beyond their pre-war networks.
- 95% of NGOs reported either a positive effect on their financial state or no change, demonstrating their ability to maintain financial stability while expanding their networks, adding programs, and continuing operations in a time of crisis.
- All of the NGOs (100%) reported either an improvement in their public relations or no change, indicating that they were either able to capitalize on the discourse to benefit their work or, at the very least, avoid the the crossfire of negative discourse.
- The most common self-reported main challenge in the first few months of the war was staying focused on organizational strategy (32%). The next most common challenge was staff capacity (26%).

**FINDING #4: NGOs are developing new inclusive models of engagement in order to reach deeply within the Israeli and Palestinian societies.**


- There has often been criticism of the peacebuilding field that the NGOs and donors involved are “preaching to the choir,” meaning that they work with target audiences and beneficiaries who are already convinced that peace is a better path forward than continued fighting.
- However, Amal-Tikva’s internal mapping of NGOs showed that leaders in the field seem to have already noted the need to reach more deeply into their own societies in order to change societal views of what is possible, either by creating parallel uninationa l programs or pivoting to entirely separate work within each society on its own.
- This marks a shift from a model of focusing efforts on trying to maximize the number of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounters toward a model which focuses on solving social problems that affect each society uniquely, whether in the presence of the other or not.
- Some peacebuilding NGOs offer both binational and uninationa l programs. Many adopt a diversity of approaches to social change which differ in conflict analysis and target audiences. The most common approach among surveyed NGOs is Education (12 NGOs). Other commonly shared approaches include Encounter (9 NGOs), Political Advocacy (9 NGOs), Entrepreneurship (5 NGOs), and Women’s Empowerment (5 NGOs).

## Key Recommendations

**RECOMMENDATION #1: NGOs must operate with excellence and professionalism in order to achieve real impact. The donor community should demand this excellence and invest in it.** NGOs worldwide struggle with inefficiency, lack of capacity, minimal funding, and more. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, NGOs have additional challenges related to the cross-border nature of their work.

- NGOs that are strategic are resilient. It is critical that NGO leadership invest in their organizations’ capacity by adopting strategic thinking in order to become more effective. We propose that donors adopt the same terminology around strategic thinking in their monitoring and evaluation processes to enable the field to scale and be as effective as possible.
- NGOs should be wary of outsourcing their monitoring and evaluation to external parties, as the focus is often on making an NGO *look good* rather than on helping the NGO *do its work well*.

## The Strategy Pyramid (See La Piana, 2008)



- The La Piana model depicted here conceptualizes strategy as a pyramid that makes monitoring and evaluation efforts feel more manageable.<sup>4</sup>
  - This pyramid demonstrates that organizational strategy is at the top because everything else flows from it.
  - Next is the programmatic strategy, followed by the operational strategy.
- When an organization is thinking strategically, it carefully considers each of the three levels of strategy and how they are interrelated.<sup>5</sup>
- MEPPA and other key donors can and should be holding NGOs to a higher standard of monitoring and evaluation than ever before, focused on impact-driven results aligned with a sound theory of change, rather than linked back to the two-state solution or any other end-game result.
- In order for civil society to effectively engage a critical mass, funders and NGOs need to share a common language focused on impact.

**RECOMMENDATION #2: Civil society actors dedicated to peacebuilding should lean into their national and/or religious identities and seek to engage communities within their own societies, including those that have been marginalized by previous peacebuilding efforts.**

- Right now, the reality is so violent that engaging Israelis and Palestinians in dialogue or even basic-level encounters may not be the most effective way to encourage their openness toward a new, nonviolent construct with the other side.
- Uninational work, defined as engaging within one society within the framework of a peacebuilding-focused theory of change, can provide the safety and comfort for individuals to engage in deep questions and challenges related to peacebuilding without having to directly face the other.

<sup>4</sup> La Piana, D. (2008). *The Nonprofit Strategy Revolution*. Fieldstone Alliance, St. Paul, Minnesota, p. 26.

<sup>5</sup> La Piana, D. (2008), p. 26.

- The Diamond Approach<sup>6</sup> is a visual representation of that suggestion. The diamond has four points—the top representing political/diplomatic “top-down” peacemaking, the bottom representing grassroots peacebuilding efforts, and the sides representing each side of the conflict, which in this case are the Israeli and Palestinian societies.
- The Diamond Approach encourages uninational engagement with the intention of sharing observations and developing approaches across national lines that will enable each society to see the development of a new nonviolent construct (explained below) from within their religious and national aspirations.

## Diamond Approach to Peacebuilding



### **RECOMMENDATION #3: Civil society peacebuilding should engage key actors, including religious/political decision-makers, community leaders, and even spoilers.**

While peace processes over the last 30 years have continually excluded certain key actors and effectively positioned them as spoilers, it is those spoilers who, since the Second Intifada, have transformed the status quo altogether—from pursuing peace accords to entrenching irredentist claims.

- Because the spoilers of the peace process became so influential, changing the current reality toward peacebuilding can only happen *with them*.
- This is precisely why civil society must work to engage the illiberal factions within their societies to understand that a new nonviolent construct is the most effective way to realize their religious and nationalistic aspirations.
- Only by engaging key actors can peacebuilders reach deeply enough inside their own societies to change the intractable nature of the conflict and move toward a nonviolent political horizon.
- This has worked in other contexts, such as in Northern Ireland leading up to the Good Friday Agreement.
  - While grassroots efforts were critical in sowing the conditions for peace, the scale that the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) enabled is what allowed grassroots work to succeed.
  - MEPPA can learn from the success of IFI and create a similar model to scale strategic peacebuilding work inside Israeli and Palestinian societies.

### **RECOMMENDATION #4: Civil society peacemaking efforts should change the public discourse on the conflict.**

- As the world remains preoccupied with the ongoing Israel-Gaza war, we are witnessing the radicalization of public discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at home and abroad.
- The root cause of toxic and counterproductive discourse around the conflict stems from a similar source: people don’t know what positive change can look like.

<sup>6</sup> Designed by Amal-Tikva, 2024.

- Peacebuilding is not just the lot of political elites but also of ordinary civilians leading social change efforts.
- Civil society peacebuilding must change the way activists relate to peacebuilding—from protest movements focused on rallying large turnouts to social change focused on scaling measurable impact.
- Peacebuilding efforts should also change the way peacebuilding is understood in the global discourse on the conflict—from negotiation summits and armistice agreements to long-term processes by which warring societies adopt nonviolence as the means to achieving their national goals.


## Moving Forward

Every morning, we—the Israelis and Palestinians in the peacebuilding field—wake up to see that the situation we live in is more violent and desperate than we could have conjured in our nightmares. Yet we show up to work and keep at it, constantly asking ourselves, “What is it that we’re fighting for, and is it even possible?” This report seeks to explore this question.

Both peacemakers (defined as diplomatic and political level negotiators and decision-makers) and peacebuilders (defined as NGO leaders, activists, and lay leaders) need to recognize that creating a more peaceful reality will take time, yet it is attainable if done strategically and in coordination with one another. Each side needs to build toward concrete measurable impact laid out with a timeline and attainable goals and objectives. This process may also be aided by reframing the concept of “peace” from a utopia or the fulfillment of one side’s national or religious aspirations into a “nonviolent reality” in which each side can live peacefully in the land symbiotically with the other. However, in order to create that nonviolent reality, there must be a value of nonviolence rooted in the national and religious aspirations of each side.

We understand that the adoption of the value of nonviolence in both societies is a matter of generational change. In light of this, we believe that the following framework for building the new reality over time is one to keep in mind as we work toward measured scalable impact.

### The Path to a New Nonviolent Construct



#### *The Path to a New Nonviolent Construct Explained*

Reality of Violence

- *Reality of Violence:* The reality of violence refers to a dynamic in which Israelis and Palestinians are in a state of active violent conflict. This is the circumstance under which this report has been written.

Nonviolence under the Threat of Violence

- *Nonviolence under the threat of violence:* This refers to constantly attempted violence between the two sides which is mitigated only by police and military forces, physical and geo-political

barriers, and/or fear of repercussions. While this section maintains some level of protection over lives, it insinuates a reality in which the two sides are in active conflict that is beginning to be controlled and therefore slightly less active.

Status Quo  
of Nonviolence

- *Status quo of nonviolence*: This refers to a constant, low-level threat of violence, maintaining a sense of normalcy in which both sides are relatively safe. There have been several points throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where majorities in each society experienced this status quo, although it is not sustainable as tension and hatred continue to simmer within each society against the other.

Value  
of Nonviolence

- *Value of nonviolence*: This refers to a state of nonviolence in which each side of the conflict has internalized and declared that the best way for their religious and nationalistic ideologies to be realized is through a nonviolent construct. This has yet to be reached between Israelis and Palestinians, but it is the only path toward a sustainable reality in which hatred, tension, and violence are no longer the dominant descriptors of the dynamic between both societies.

New  
Nonviolent  
Construct

- *New nonviolent construct*: Israelis and Palestinians are in a state of relative peace. We use the term 'relative' to acknowledge that this new reality will not bring utopia but rather a norm in which both societies recognize that nonviolence is the most effective way to actualize their national and religious aspirations and connection to the land.
- *Danger of regression*: The danger of regression demonstrates that the conflict is never completely over and the work of peacebuilding will always continue, even in a post-conflict reality. This underlying potential for violence should continually be reviewed and monitored in order to be addressed as needed.

←  
Danger of Regression

As the peacebuilding practitioner and scholar Mari Fitzduff writes, “peace processes are cumulative.”<sup>7</sup> While we see that the capacity and strategy of peacebuilding efforts until now have been lacking, we also see significant signs of improvement in both and have learned from where organizations have succeeded and failed. The resilience in the field we had been sensing was more than validated by the data outlined in this report, and by the reactions to this data by key stakeholders who had the opportunity to review the report before its publication. Despite the constant deterioration of the political reality and the unprecedented violence of the ongoing war, peacebuilding efforts have not only continued but have continued to professionalize and grow. We hope that this report serves the field of peacebuilding as a foundation for the assessment of efforts to build Israeli-Palestinian peace.

<sup>7</sup> Mari Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2002, p. 181.



## 1. Introduction

If we are so bold, we will admit that there has never really been a strategic field of civil society peacebuilding. There have been NGOs implementing programs, effectively or not. There have been activists and protests, strategic or not. In most cases, civil society actors dedicated to peacebuilding have more or less been waiting for a political horizon to give meaning to their efforts. In other cases, civil society has sought to create the conditions necessary for a political agreement—efforts that have never been achieved. In order for peacebuilding initiatives to constitute a strong field committed to and capable of making large-scale, sustainable impact toward peace, there must be strategic coordination of the efforts of the many organizations and individuals doing similar work around a common goal, and creating the conditions necessary for their work to succeed<sup>8</sup>. It is time to seriously evaluate what peacebuilding efforts and methods have worked, what has not worked, and what we can do to make sure that our work yields actual, sustainable change.

We see that peacebuilding work until now has certainly not been succeeding at a scale that reaches society at large, demonstrated in the release of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion polls published at the start of 2023, which found that: a) large majorities of Israeli Jews (85%) and Palestinians (86%) do not trust the other side; and b) only a third of both societies support a two-state solution<sup>9</sup>. In short, Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of a potential peace process, as well as support for peace, were extremely negative even before October 7. Does this spell the unequivocal failure of the field of civil society peacebuilding? Our research in the data below as well as our experience working with many of these NGOs over the last four years indicates otherwise.

As of the publication of this report, the Israel-Gaza war persists well after October 7. It is necessary, at this point, to make two observations about the war providing the context of this report:

- The first observation is about the framing of our survey. The interviews conducted for this report were done in the shadow of war. Our aim was to collect information about how NGOs were affected by an ongoing war, with many uncertainties still lying ahead.
- The second observation is about how the context of the war relates to the subjects involved in the report. The NGO leaders who participated in the surveys, as well as the lead researchers who conducted the surveys and analyzed the data, are local Israelis and Palestinians affected personally by the war. While this report presents statistics about the state of civil society peacebuilding NGOs in the shadow of the ongoing Israel-Gaza war, the human experiences behind every figure are far more complex and painful.

Our decision to undertake a survey on the effects of the current war on the peacebuilding field while the war still persists was not a simple one. Since the war has yet to end, we are unable to attempt to let the data tell the story of how the war and its effect on civil society was something of the past. Additionally, the uncertainties of operating an NGO in an active war are manifold and differ from NGO to NGO – depending on variables such as location of activities, leadership experience, and target audience.

Aware of the limited scope of our research, we found it nonetheless valuable to survey civil society peacebuilding NGOs amidst the unfolding chaos of the present war. Based on interviews with 52 NGOs engaged in cross-border peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians, our 2020 report, “[The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding](#),” observed a correlation between periods of extreme violence and a shift in approaches to peacebuilding. Initiatives formed in the wake of such periods as a matter of trend adopted new approaches to peacebuilding. For example, among NGOs founded

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8 The James Irvine Foundation. (2009). *The Strong Field Framework*, Focus.

9 “Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll,” January 24, 2024. [https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20Report\\_%20English\\_Joint%20Poll%2024%20Jan%202023.pdf](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20Report_%20English_Joint%20Poll%2024%20Jan%202023.pdf)

between 2001 and 2005 – years that witnessed the Second Intifada and the Gaza Disengagement – emerges an emphasis on interfaith dialogue as an approach to people-to-people encounters, while among NGOs founded in the years 2014 to 2020, we observed increased adoption of a technology and entrepreneurship approach.

These observations suggest that the field of peacebuilding is liable to generate new approaches and seek to engage new target audiences after periods of extreme violence. The common sense explanation is that navigating the work of NGOs during a crisis makes activists evaluate their efforts and ultimately calls for a re-assessment of strategy and implementation (something we argue should be a constant priority). In order to track the influence of the current crisis on the future of peacebuilding, we decided to begin our research efforts on the effects of the war as the fighting continues.

We define ‘peacebuilding,’ for the sake of this report and also for our work, as working to create a more peaceful reality for Palestinians and Israelis, defined by: a) less hatred, tension, and violence; b) increased quality of life; and c) improved systems for interaction. Peacebuilding cannot merely be about preparing civil society for a future political peace agreement; it must also include taking concrete steps to improve lives today.

**This report aims to serve the field of peacebuilding, including NGO leaders, activists, donors, scholars, and governments, as a foundation for the assessment of the efforts of peacebuilding in this complicated time.**

## 2. Research Process

### A. Comparing the State of Civil Society Peacebuilding in 2020 and 2024

In 2020, after surveying 52 NGOs engaged in cross-border peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians, we published “[The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding](#),” a needs assessment of Israeli and Palestinian NGOs. The report demonstrated key features of civil society peacebuilding NGOs with a cross-border element to their work, through statistics on leadership, budgets, staff, theories of change, organizational challenges, and more.

The 2024 survey, based on interviews with 41 NGOs, builds on the foundations of the 2020 survey in two ways: 1) It collects similar organizational data points; and 2) it comprises a majority of NGOs surveyed in 2020. Twenty-five NGOs were mapped in our 2020 and 2024 surveys, constituting 61% of organizations surveyed in 2024.<sup>10</sup> Despite the overlap between the 2020 and 2024 surveys, the 2024 survey provides a unique perspective on the effects of the current Israel-Gaza war on the field of peacebuilding, six months after October 7.

### B. Selection of NGOs

All 41 NGOs surveyed in this report are registered organizations in the State of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and some are registered in a foreign country. Satisfying our definition of peacebuilding, these organizations are currently working to create a more peaceful reality for Palestinians and/or Israelis, defined by: a) less hatred, tension, and violence; b) increased quality of life; and c) improved systems for interaction. Though there is no decisive estimate of the number of NGOs that could be classified under the foregoing definition of peacebuilding, we hold that the diversity (in terms of size, approach, location of activities, among other factors) and number of NGOs included in this survey make the generalization of our findings possible for the field of NGOs that

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<sup>10</sup> With these data points, we are able to observe trends in the field of civil society peacebuilding over this four-year period. The majority of NGOs (53%) active today that partook in 2020 were included in 2024. Out of the 52 NGOs surveyed in 2020, 47 remain active and five are no longer active for various reasons. Out of the 47 currently active NGOs surveyed in 2020, 15 NGOs that have become less active in peacebuilding were not requested for interviews, six NGOs responded to the invitation but did not schedule an interview, and one NGO became a program under another NGO which participated in the 2024 survey.



see themselves as working to build a more peaceful future.

Of the 60 NGOs that were requested to participate in the survey: 41 NGOs participated, while the remaining 19 either did not reply to the request or did not schedule an interview after expressing initial interest. Our findings are based on data collected from 38 of the total 41 NGOs surveyed; Amal-Tikva is included in the 38 NGOs. The other three NGOs are umbrella NGOs and were included to provide greater context for the data we collected at the level of individual organizations.

It is important to note that Amal-Tikva's definition of 'peacebuilding' does not necessitate a distinction between the fields of Shared Society and Cross-Border Peacebuilding between Israelis<sup>11</sup> and Palestinians<sup>12</sup>. As such, this survey includes organizations engaged in both spheres of peacebuilding<sup>13</sup>.

### **C. Data Collection & Analysis**

Our findings are based on data collected from one hour-long interviews with the leaders (CEOs or Directors) of 38 NGOs between January 21 and April 3, 2024, and a quantitative form sent to survey respondents after the interview. To maintain consistency across data collection, all interviews were led by the lead researcher, Amitai Abouzaglo, Director of Research and Education at Amal-Tikva. Notes taken during the interviews were analyzed in both deductive and inductive methods by the analysis team which included the lead researcher, two additional Amal-Tikva staff members, and an external research assistant. The analysis team developed a coding system for anecdotal answers to the questions, and statistics were drawn from coded responses. Our findings are based on the aggregate of data collected across surveyed NGOs. The data of each NGO remains confidential and will not be published in this report or in future publications.

### **D. Survey Questions**

#### **General Operations**

- When was the organization founded?
- Where is the organization registered?
- Where is the organization based?
- Who leads the organization?
- How many staff members work in the organization?
- What is the representation of national identities on the staff?
- What is the role of the board?
- What is the annual budget?
- What are the main sources of funding?
- Do any donors contribute more than 20% of the budget?

#### **War-Related Questions**

- Was the staff directly affected by the war? How?
- When did the staff return to work?
- What has staff turnover been since October 7?

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11 For this report, when we refer to "Israelis" we mean Jewish Israelis.

12 For this report, when we refer to "Palestinians" we refer to self-identifying Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, as well as Palestinians with Israeli citizenship.

13 See our discussion of the terms "Shared Society" and "Cross-Border" in the "Target Audience" finding under Organizational Statistics.

- What programs were ongoing before October 7?
- What decisions were made regarding ongoing programs?
- What programs were planned before the war to launch after October 7?
- What decisions were made regarding planned programs?
- How were beneficiaries directly affected by the war?
- Has the target audience changed since October 7?
- How has the engagement of beneficiaries been affected since October 7?
- How has the financial state changed since October 7?
- Who are your war-time benefactors?
- What are your current challenges?
- How have your public relations been affected since October 7?
- Did you issue an external statement about October 7 and/or the war and its impact?

### E. Limitations

The organizations featured in this report see themselves as engaged in civil society peacebuilding, as discussed in the “Selection of NGOs” section above. Our decision to collect data on a wide variety of NGOs is rooted in the desire to observe how organizations aspiring to build peace between Israelis and Palestinians at large – including those aspiring to build a shared society within the State of Israel and those aiming for social and political change across borders – were affected by the ongoing war. While the organizational list is both comprehensive and representative for that purpose, it is possible that organizations exist and are active that were not included in the mapping. Input and additions are welcome as we continue to map and learn.<sup>14</sup>

We also note again that we are not an independent research institute but rather an active member of the field we seek to serve. We have included ourselves, Amal-Tikva, in the survey.

### Participating NGOs, 2024 (41)

The three organizations that were interviewed yet not included in the survey’s data collection and analysis are marked with an asterisk. They are all organizations that serve the peacebuilding field as either an umbrella organization, donor, or service provider.

0202: Points of View from Jerusalem	Parents Circle Families Forum
50:50 Startups	Pathways Institute for Negotiation Education
Alliance for Middle East Peace*	PeacePlayers Middle East
Amal-Tikva	Project Rozana
Arava Institute for Environmental Studies	Road to Recovery
B8 of Hope*	Roots/Judur/Shorashim
Combatants for Peace	ROPES: The Regional Organization for Peace, Economics & Security
EcoPeace Middle East	Rossing Center for Education and Dialogue

<sup>14</sup> If you are a member of an organization or are aware of an organization that did not participate in our 2024 survey but would be interested in doing so, please contact [info@amal-tikva.org](mailto:info@amal-tikva.org).

Geneva Initiative	Seeds of Peace
Hand in Hand	Shatil*
Interfaith Encounter Association	Shrinking the Conflict
Jerusalem Intercultural Center	Sia'h Shalom (Talking Peace)
Jerusalem International YMCA	Taghyeer Movement
Herbert C. Kelman Institute	Teacher's Lounge
Kulna Jerusalem	Tech2Peace
A Land for All	The Jerusalem Model
Lissan	The Jerusalem Youth Chorus
MEET: Middle East Entrepreneurs of Tomorrow	Tomorrow's Women
Mosaica	Women Wage Peace
Musalaha	Zimam
Palestinian Internship Program (PIP)	

### Participating NGOs, 2020 & 2024 Overlap (25)

0202: Points of View from Jerusalem	Mosaica
50:50 Startups	Musalaha
A Land for All	Pathways Institute for Negotiation Education
Arava Institute for Environmental Studies	PeacePlayers Middle East
Combatants for Peace	Road to Recovery
Creativity for Peace	Roots/Judur/Shorashim
EcoPeace Middle East	Seeds of Peace
Interfaith Encounter Association	Sia'h Shalom (Talking Peace)
Jerusalem International YMCA	Tech2Peace
Jerusalem Youth Chorus	The Jerusalem Intercultural Center
Kulna Jerusalem	The Jerusalem Model
Lissan	Parents Circle Families Forum
MEET: Middle East Entrepreneurs of Tomorrow	

## 3. Key Findings


**FINDING #1: The field of civil society peacebuilding has gained capacity and has become more strategic since 2020.**

Though years of program evaluation and research have proven that person-to-person peacebuilding

can be highly effective in changing attitudes and enhancing cooperation in ethnic and territorial conflicts around the world, our 2020 deep dive into the challenges of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding discovered that 91% of organizations were unable to reach intended organizational benchmarks due to a lack of funding coupled with a lack of organizational capacity.<sup>15</sup> While sustainable funding and staff capacity remain barriers to success, it is encouraging to note from the 2024 data that this is changing, albeit slowly. From a purely quantitative perspective, we see that budgets have increased and staff teams are larger and more diverse. We also see that while there is still a bias toward Israeli leadership, the number of Palestinian directors has doubled.

**Budget sizes in the 25 overlapping NGOs (surveyed by Amal-Tikva in 2020 and 2024) have increased.** In 2020, 48% of NGOs (12 organizations) reported a budget exceeding \$500,000, while in 2024, 68% (17 organizations) reported the same figure. The largest change occurred in the percentage of NGOs reporting a budget below \$200,000. In 2020, 32% of NGOs (eight organizations) reported budgets below the \$200,000 mark, while in 2024, only 8% (two organizations) reported similarly. Moreover, there was an increase of 12% (three organizations) of NGOs that reported a budget in the \$500,000 to \$1,000,00 range.

### Comparison Statistics: 2020 to 2024




**Annual budget sizes in 2024:** Annual budget sizes vary across the 38 NGOs surveyed in 2024, yet the plurality of NGO budgets range from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000 (39%). Five percent of budgets fall below \$200,000, 29% of budgets range from \$200,000 to \$500,000, 11% range from \$1,000,000 to \$3,000,000, and 16% exceed \$3,000,000.

15 Research and Report, April 2020, Amal-Tikva. <https://www.amal-tikva.org/report>

## Organizational Profile Statistics: 2024


Annual Budget



**Palestinian leadership increased, yet most NGO leaders are still Israeli.** Organizations' leaderships became increasingly more equal over this period, as the number of Palestinian leaders increased from 8% (two organizations) to 16% (four organizations), and the number of co-directors increased from 24% (six organizations) to 36% (nine organizations)<sup>16</sup>. Though Palestinian leadership doubled during this period, it is important to note that the field of peacebuilding, as represented by these 25 NGOs, remains an Israeli-led field<sup>17</sup>.

## Comparison Statistics: 2020 to 2024


Leadership




**Staff representation of Israelis and Palestinians has become more equal since 2020.** NGOs have become more equal in staff composition. In 2020, 40% of NGOs (ten organizations) reported their staff as being “about equal” between Israeli and Palestinian employees, while in 2024 the number stood at 60% (15 organizations). The rise in Palestinian engagement with the field, such as increased Palestinian representation in NGO leadership (trend 2) and staff composition (trend 3), suggest that NGO leaders have internalized the goal of making their teams more representative of the NGOs’ target audiences.

<sup>16</sup> All shifts occurred among binational NGOs.

<sup>17</sup> See our discussion of the matter above in “Section A, Organizational Statistics on the 38 Surveyed NGOs in 2024” under the section “Leadership.”



**Staff sizes have increased slightly.** The sizes of staff teams grew only marginally. In 2020, 16% of NGOs (four organizations) reported a staff size above 20 employees, while in 2024 the portion grew to 24% (six organizations). However, when we look at the trajectories of individual NGOs, we see that 40% of NGOs increased their staff sizes (ten organizations), 48% reported no change (12 organizations), and 12% reported a smaller staff size (three organizations)<sup>18</sup>.




**Staff size: The plurality of staff sizes ranges from 5 to 11 staff members.** Staff sizes vary across surveyed NGOs, yet the plurality of NGOs are made up of staff sizes that range from 5 to 10 members (34%). Twenty-nine percent of NGOs have a staff size that falls below five members, 21% of NGOs have a staff size that ranges from 11 to 20 employees, and 16% of NGOs have a staff size that exceeds 20 employees.

<sup>18</sup> Among the ten NGOs that reported growth in number of employees, five reported in 2020 a staff in the 1-5 employee range, and in 2024 reported a staff in the 6-10 employee range. Additionally, three NGOs grew from the 5-11 range to the 11-20 range. Among the three NGOs that reported a downsizing, two reported staff sizes in the 6-10 range in 2020 and fell into the 1-5 range in 2024.

## Organizational Profile Statistics: 2024

### Staff Size

# of staff members



While in some ways NGOs still lack the professional capacity and resources essential to implement their strategies at scale, the quantitative growth is encouraging. From a qualitative perspective, we see in some ways from the data—and especially from our experience with 31 NGOs in our network— that many NGOs handled their program operations phenomenally well during this time of crisis, showing resilience and strategic thinking. While it is not surprising that peacebuilding leaders who have stayed in the field amidst significant financial cuts in 2018, the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the 2021 Israel-Palestine crisis, have gained resilience in recent years, the ways in which they demonstrated their resilience, we believe, shows the strategic nature of their work.

**Challenges:** As outlined in 2020, issues of stable funding, staff retention, infrastructure, recruitment, and professional acumen for measuring impact were the most notable capacities lacking in the field. While many of these issues do still cause NGOs to struggle, the research from this past year has shown quite a dramatic shift, if not in the NGO capacity itself, at least in the NGO leaderships’ ability to identify the areas of growth required in order to help them succeed.

As opposed to listing funding, staff retention, and recruitment as key challenges hindering organizational success, the main challenges listed were actually the implementation of their strategy and staff capacity. These listed challenges show that the field has matured in the last four years, as leadership now asks itself how it can work more effectively and strategically, instead of focusing on blaming external factors such as lack of funding and recruitment opportunities.


The top challenge reported by the largest percentage of NGOs (32%) is strategy. The next most common challenge is staff capacity (26%). We recorded survey responses to the question “What is your main challenge?” After observing commonalities across responses, we classified NGO challenges into five categories:

- **Strategy** – the difficulty of making high-level decisions or implementing programs due to the lack of an updated conflict analysis and/or organizational vision. In the ongoing war, this is often a result of objective uncertainty of the region’s state of affairs on a daily basis and in

*“Many NGOs handled their program operations phenomenally well during this time of crisis, showing resilience and strategic thinking.”*

the near future.

- **Staff capacity** – the lack of adequate staff power due to fatigue of employees and/or lack of roles on staff.
- **Sustainable funding** – the lack of stable, long-term sources of funding for an organization’s operations and/or programs.
- **Travel limitations** – structural barriers in movement that impede an organization’s capacity to implement a program or involve participants from certain regions.
- **Recruitment** – the difficulty in attracting candidates for programs due to increased skepticism and hostility toward programs seeking to build bridges.



For example, one question that came up many times during the post-October 7 interviews was around the question of whether or not the organization should release a public statement about the war. Some organizations rushed to immediately publish a statement about October 7 and the war, while other organizations paused, asking themselves and other stakeholders if it would be impactful to release a statement, analyzing how a statement does or does not further their organizational mission and in what ways. From the perspective of strategic thinking, answering the basic question of whether or not to release public statements (or how quickly) does not matter – but what does matter is the way in which the organizations make decisions, either from a place of strategy and impact or mere impulse and habit.

Another indicator that the field has matured in the last four years is that, instead of listing a lack of funding as a core challenge, organizational leadership mentioned the need for financial sustainability. This stems from understanding that the need to diversify donors, diversify income methods, and develop income plans that enable institutional growth lies with them. This coincides with our hypothesis that when organizations are better funded, they have the space to think about strategy and sustainability. The survey finding by which NGOs report financial sustainability as a main challenge correlates with a growth in overall budget sizes as well as reported overall financial gains since October 7, which the NGO leaders do not take for granted as renewable in coming years.

**FINDING #2: The Israelis and Palestinians involved in civil society peacebuilding efforts—as activists, beneficiaries, and program participants—have been widely affected by the ongoing war.**



The pain and suffering experienced by Palestinians and Israelis throughout the ongoing war cannot be captured in statistics. However, it is notable that the staff and participants dedicated to civil society peacebuilding are not working at a distance from the war but are instead in the vulnerable position of being directly affected by it. Though we cannot quantify the countless ways the war has made life more difficult, we find it important to share how peacebuilding NGOs are part and parcel of the societies they seek to change for the better. We asked respondents how the organization's staff members and beneficiaries were directly affected by the war as of the date of the interview<sup>19</sup> in terms of the following categories: Bereaved Families, Displacement, Reserve Duty, and Restricted Movement.

**Bereaved Families** is defined as having a first, second, or third-degree relative who was killed as a result of the war. Three out of 38 organizations reported one or more staff members who lost a relative in the war. Of the total three staff members affected, one was Israeli and two were Palestinian. 15 out of 38 organizations reported one or more beneficiaries who lost a relative in the war. Out of 20 beneficiaries affected across 15 organizations, nine were Israeli and 11 Palestinian.

**Displacement** is defined as the inability to access and/or reside in one's home. Eight out of 38 organizations reported one or more staff members who were displaced due to the war. Of the total eight staff members affected, six were Israeli and two were Palestinian. Twelve out of 38 organizations reported one or more beneficiaries who were displaced due to the war. Out of 14 beneficiaries affected across 12 organizations, eight were Israeli and six Palestinian.

**Reserve Duty** pertains to Israelis who completed mandatory military service and actively serve in reserve duty. Nine out of 38 organizations reported one or more staff members who were called to reserves due to the war. Eleven out of 38 organizations reported one or more beneficiaries who were called to reserves due to the war.

**Restricted Movement** pertains to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and refers to the inability to travel freely due to checkpoints and closures of roads and cities. Fifteen out of 38 organizations reported one or more staff members who were affected by restricted movement due to the war. Twenty-six out of 38 organizations reported one or more beneficiaries who were affected by restricted movement due to the war.

**Palestinians in Gaza & the Field of Peacebuilding:** Before October 7, contacts with Palestinians in Gaza among civil society peacebuilding organizations were few. In addition to the physical barriers isolating Gaza from the rest of the region, the risks of cross-border contacts with Israelis were high for Palestinian Gazans, and civil society in Gaza suffered from severe political repression<sup>20</sup>. Despite these conditions, five NGOs surveyed in 2024 worked directly in Gaza or employed someone residing

8/38

#of organizations that reported one or more staff members who were displaced due to the war

12/38

#of organizations that reported one or more beneficiaries were displaced due to the war

9/38

#of organizations that reported one or more staff members were called to reserves due to the war

11/38

#of organizations that reported one or more beneficiaries were called to reserves due to the war

15/38

#of organizations that reported one or more staff members were affected by restricted movement due to the war

26/38

#of organizations that reported one or more beneficiaries were affected by restricted movement due to the war

19 Interviews were held between January 21 and April 3, 2024.


20 Members of the Gaza Youth Committee, which made contacts with Israelis for the purpose of advocating for nonviolence and reconciliation, were imprisoned by Hamas officials in 2020. For more information: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/world/middleeast/peace-activists-convicted-gaza.html>

in Gaza before October 7. These numbers, however, do not convey the numerous connections NGOs and their staff have to Palestinians in Gaza directly affected by the war. These connections include family members of NGO employees, alumni of NGO programs, and organizational partners. NGOs have leveraged these connections to deliver aid and support campaigns to help individuals and families leave the strip whenever possible. Finally, it is important to acknowledge the experience of mass displacement and restricted movement, in addition to the risk of bombings, that Palestinians in Gaza have faced throughout the war.

**Target audiences/beneficiaries:** The overwhelming majority of NGOs we surveyed are binational organizations in staff and outreach, and the majority of binational NGOs work in both Shared Society & Cross-Border contexts. This means that not only is peacebuilding led by Palestinians and Israelis deeply affected by the conflict, but that they are serving each other through their work. Though peacebuilding NGOs engage many subsections of society, the foundational breakdown of an NGO’s target audience most often falls along lines of nationality and citizenship. For the purpose of this report, we characterize NGOs as either binational or uninational NGOs. We characterize NGOs that engage both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians (including Palestinian citizens of Israel, West Bankers and/or Gazans) as binational NGOs. On the other hand, we characterize NGOs that engage exclusively with Jewish Israelis or exclusively with Palestinians as uninational NGOs.

### Organizational Profile Statistics: 2024

Target Audience (Binational NGOs)



Examples of binational peacebuilding efforts include organizing dialogue seminars, professional development opportunities, and research projects on regional issues. It is important to note that several initiatives that we characterize as binational deliver services to the disadvantaged national group in light of the asymmetrical nature of the conflict. Examples of uninational peacebuilding efforts include promoting the values of tolerance and pluralism within the national school system, bridging internal divides in one’s own society, and participating in one’s national political system with a pro-peace agenda.


Our choice of binational/uninational categorization is not self-evident. Influenced by the funding paradigms of foreign donors, the fundamental categorization of peacebuilding NGOs has been into the subfields of Cross-Border and Shared Society. Cross-Border characterizes efforts that engage Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who are not citizens of the State of Israel (primarily in the West Bank and Gaza). Shared Society characterizes efforts that engage Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel, i.e. between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.

We chose to characterize the NGOs surveyed in this report as either binational or uninational, as

this categorization best reflects their self-reporting<sup>21</sup>. The simple observation is that the majority of binational organizations we surveyed engage both shared society and cross-border target audiences. The fundamental difference in target audience between NGOs, therefore, is not which Palestinian population the NGO engages, but rather whether the NGO engages Jewish Israelis and Palestinians or focuses on a single national population. We recommend characterizing NGOs initially on the basis of whether they engage the two national communities or focus on one group, and only thereafter specifying target audiences.

As mentioned, out of the 38 NGOs surveyed in this report, 32 (84%) are binational organizations and six (16%) are uninational organizations. Six percent of organizations surveyed are binational NGOs that work exclusively in a Shared Society context. The majority of NGOs that work with both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, which we define as binational, work in both Shared Society and Cross-Border contexts (58%), while only 36% of such organizations work exclusively in a Cross-Border context.

### Organizational Profile Statistics: 2024 Target Audiences



### FINDING #3: Civil society peacebuilding NGOs demonstrated organizational resilience in the face of trauma as well as capacity to stay strategic.

The majority of NGO programs either continued or were launched during the first six months of war. We asked survey respondents to detail their programmatic activity and decision-making since October 7.

Of the peacebuilding programs that had begun prior to October 7 (47 total):

- 85% of programs continued;
- 60% of those continuing programs remained binational and 30% remained uninational.
- Only 10% of the ongoing programs were changed from binational to uninational<sup>22</sup>.

For programs that were planned before October 7 and scheduled to start after October 7 (74 total):




<sup>21</sup> We chose to focus the sample of our survey on organizations that are not Shared Society organizations in order to fill the research gap of such peacebuilding NGOs. The overwhelming majority of organizations we surveyed (94%) engage in Cross-Border work, whether in connection to Palestinians in Jerusalem or in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, we found it important to include some organizations working exclusively in the Shared Society space since we view the work of advancing the position of Arab citizens of Israel and encouraging Jewish-Arab partnership within Israel as part of peacebuilding. For a wealth of studies on the field of Shared Society organizations, see the publications at NAS Consulting <https://www.nasconsulting.co.il/publications/> and the Inter Agency Task Force <https://www.iataskforce.org/section/learn/#resources>.

<sup>22</sup> Programs that were active on October 7 and continued thereafter did not resume immediately after the war broke out. On average these programs paused for three weeks, while a few others paused for more than a month.




- 60% were launched within the first six months of the war.
- 40% were delayed indefinitely or canceled.
- 70% of such programs remained binational.
- 19% remained uninational, and 11% changed from binational to uninational.

## Effects of the War on Programs

### Programs that began before Oct. 7



### Programs that began after Oct. 7




**Staff turnover has been stable overall since October 7.** The staff of peacebuilding NGOs remained largely intact during the war. There were 11 employees across ten NGOs who left their work during the war, while 13 employees joined eight NGOs. We asked survey respondents about the reasons employees left. Of the employees who left, five employees were reported to have been motivated by war-related stressors, such as having a spouse in active reserve duty, that made it difficult to maintain employment. Two were reported to have left due to ideological reasons, and four were reported to have left unrelated to ideology or war-related stressors.

**Humanitarian aid:** In the first six months of the war, 40% of surveyed NGOs (15 organizations) delivered aid to people in need. Eight NGOs served Palestinians, two NGOs served Israelis, and five NGOs served both Palestinians and Israelis. The kinds of aid supplied and/or delivered by NGOs vary from NGO to NGO, though the three main types of aid were food, cash, and medical supplies. The role of NGOs included raising funds for supplies, identifying people in need, and organizing the packing and delivery of supplies. Instances of aid delivery included:

- Delivering food parcels to Palestinian workers from Gaza stranded in Bethlehem at the start of the war

- Delivering medicine to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem
- Disbursing funds for essential supplies to internally displaced Israelis from the South
- Disbursing funds for medical and food supplies for Palestinians in Gaza
- Transporting displaced Israelis to temporary places of residence

**Effects of the War**  
Humanitarian Aid Delivery



**Expanded target audience/beneficiaries:** The majority of NGOs (57%) have been engaging with beneficiaries and stakeholders beyond their pre-war networks, while 40% have been focused internally<sup>23</sup>. We asked respondents how their organization’s activities were shaped in response to the war. This question stands in contrast to our question about the continuity/ discontinuity of programs that began before October 7 or were planned before the war to launch afterward. While many NGOs responded to the war by turning inward in order to support and strengthen already existing networks and beneficiaries, the majority of surveyed NGOs (57%) responded to the war by engaging broader audiences.


We characterized how organizations engaged with their target audiences or beneficiaries according to the following categories:

- Community Engagement – focus on investing in current staff, alumni, and programs in order to strengthen the organization’s foundations and ensure the possibility of operating during and after the war.
- Aid – focus on supplying people affected by the war with their material needs.
- Services – focus on delivering services (e.g., dialogue facilitation, translation), which became more pressing as a result of the war.
- Advocacy – focus on leveraging the break of the pre-war status quo in order to influence public opinion and decision-makers to adopt proposals of solutions to the conflict at the macro (borders) or micro level (environment).
- Mediation – focus on settling conflicts at the local and/or international level by enabling communication between different and adversarial stakeholders.
- Policy Research – focus on studying the damage caused by the war and making recommendations

<sup>23</sup> The remaining three percent covers one organization which has been inactive since the outset of the war.

for the ‘Day After.’<sup>24</sup>

Organizations that were characterized as focused on ‘Community Engagement’ since the start of the war make up 40% of NGOs that centered their efforts on their pre-war constituencies. On the other hand, organizations in all other categories comprise the 57% of NGOs that have engaged new audiences and/or beneficiaries. The remaining 3% represents one surveyed NGO which remained inactive since the start of the war.




**Financial impact: The plurality of NGOs reported a positive impact on their financial capacity in the first six months of the war.**

- 42% of NGOs reported a positive effect on the financial state of the organization since the war.
- 53% reported no change.
- Twenty NGOs reported a neutral effect of the war on the organization’s fundraising efforts (53%).
- 16 NGOs (42%) reported a positive effect of the war on the organization’s fundraising.
- Two organizations (5%) reported a negative effect.
- Most of the organizations that experienced an economic boost during the first six months of the war received funds from new donors (12 NGOs).
- At the same time, several organizations reported increased funding from existing donors (7 NGOs).

Anecdotally, some organizations are worried about the sustainability of the new funds donated by new benefactors (see “Challenges” section below). As for the two NGOs that reported a negative effect of the war on fundraising, one cited funder skepticism about its work since the war, while the other attributed funding cuts to the inability to run the program for which the funding was designated.


<sup>24</sup> The program focus ‘Community Engagement’ is characterized as an NGO’s engagement of stakeholders who were in their network before the war. All other categories involve NGOs engaging with stakeholders beyond their pre-war networks.

## Effects of the War Fundraising Since Oct. 7



**Public relations:** 37% of NGOs reported an improvement in their public relations, while 63% did not report a change in their public relations. Among the 38 NGOs surveyed, 14 organizations reported positive growth in their public relations, while the remaining 24 organizations reported no change at all. Organizations that reported a positive effect of the war on their public relations cited increased media coverage as the main factor of growth, while others reported increased exposure of speaking tours, primarily abroad. Most media coverage reported by NGOs was in foreign press outlets.

## Effects of the War Public Relations After Oct. 7



**FINDING #4: New inclusive models are being developed and tried to engage more deeply within Israeli and Palestinian societies than ever before.**

There has often been a criticism of the peacebuilding field that the NGOs and donors involved are “preaching to the choir,” meaning that they work with target audiences and beneficiaries who are already convinced that peace is a better path forward than continued fighting. However, even before October 7, leaders in the field seem to have already noted the need to reach more deeply into their own societies to change societal views of what is possible. This marks a shift from a model of focusing efforts on trying to maximize the number of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounters, toward a model which focuses on solving social problems that affect each society uniquely, whether in the presence of the other or not.

In February 2023, Amal-Tikva hosted a gathering to share trends that we were noticing in the theories of change of the NGOs in our programs (19 at that time, 31 at time of writing) and to invite discussion about those trends with the intention of fostering collaboration and support. At the time, we were struck by how theories of change relating to Israeli and Palestinian societies



demonstrated a nuanced and holistic understanding of each society's unique struggle under the conflict and assessed what it would take for each society to feel that the reality had become a more peaceful one. We distilled the shared elements of each generalized theory of change into the following:

*If we inspire the Israeli public at large to believe in, hope for, and demand peace, through understanding that it is in the best interest of the State of Israel and the Jewish people, and that the current status quo is not,*

*If we build agency and demonstrate to the Palestinian people that they can improve their daily realities and quality of life, including in relation to access to land, movement, and sense of dignity,*

*and if we offer opportunities and infrastructure for taking action,*

*Then Israelis will feel it is worthwhile to act toward and demand a more peaceful reality,*

*Then Palestinians will feel it is worthwhile to act toward and demand a peaceful reality,*

*and then the cycle of violence and tension between the two sides will decrease, and then the conflict will feel less intractable, more solvable, and worthy of political engagement.*

These nuanced theories of change suggested significantly more uninational engagement than previously offered within the peacebuilding field, whether as the program format or as a significant portion of the program. Some programs require engaging in uninational dialogue and processing as a prerequisite to dialoguing with the other side. These parallel theories of change, as well as the conversation between the NGOs after presenting the two theories of change, showed that the decision to increase uninational work as a precursor to binational engagement was becoming increasingly adopted by civil society peacebuilding NGOs<sup>25</sup>.

Whatever the reason for the trend, we note that uninational engagement by design enables participants from communities generally opposed to peacebuilding work to participate. Their participation can lead to the broader change required within each society necessary to support nonviolent alternatives in the short term and diplomatic agreements over the long term. Note the focus on education, encounter, and advocacy below which are the key peacebuilding approaches used to reach inside society, as well as in parallel or binationally.

**Peacebuilding approaches:** Peacebuilding NGOs adopt a diversity of approaches to social change. These approaches differ in methods, conflict analysis, and target audiences (among other factors) which shape the vision and implementation of organizational goals. The most common approach among surveyed NGOs is Education (12 NGOs). Other commonly shared approaches include Encounter (9 NGOs), Political Advocacy (9 NGOs), Entrepreneurship (5 NGOs), and Women's Empowerment (5 NGOs).

While 42% of surveyed NGOs (16 organizations) adopt a single approach to peacebuilding, 58% (22 organizations) adopt multiple approaches. We did not observe any meaningful trends relating to common pairings of approaches. We characterized two organizations as Education and Political Advocacy and two organizations as Interreligious and Encounter.

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25 The shift from a focus on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue toward social change efforts and the trend toward increasing uninational elements in peacebuilding raise several questions: Is uninational peacebuilding work replacing binational engagement in peacebuilding? If so, is the work being done separately because of the difficulty in recruiting participants who are willing to join binational programs? Is the work being done separately because it is too difficult to bring binational groups together physically due to barriers of movement? Is the work being done separately because it is the most effective way to create change within each society? Does uninational peacebuilding work play a role in the sustainability of individual transformation and changing attitudes? If so, can this trend provide sustainability to the field during a time of war?




The list of approaches to peacebuilding which we used to categorize surveyed NGOs is not exhaustive. We offer brief definitions of each approach below:

- **Education** interfaces with formal and informal educational settings, teachers, and students for the sake of promoting a culture supportive of the values of peace and nonviolence. In many cases education programs are done internationally.
- **Encounter** enables the experience of meeting the other in a facilitated or unmediated setting and aims for attitudinal change.
- **Political Advocacy** aims to enact change at the level of policy through coalition building, policy writing, and community organizing. This work is also usually uninational, in some cases there are cross-border partnerships where the team is binational and coordinates together but mostly work inside their own communities.
- **Entrepreneurship** trains or convenes entrepreneurs in the pursuit of innovation based on partnership across lines of national conflict.
- **Women's Empowerment** seeks to advance the welfare of women and facilitate the growth of female leadership at the social, political, economic, and/or religious levels. This work is often uninational. In some cases, there are cross-border partnerships where the team is binational and coordinates together but mostly work inside their own communities.
- **Healthcare** provides solutions for health-related issues exacerbated by violent conflict and unequal access to resources. These programs are often focused on helping Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza have access to or learning from Israeli healthcare.
- **Interreligious Dialogue** fosters mutual understanding and channels of communication between the leaders and/or members of different religious communities.
- **Arts and Culture** provide a space for connection across national divides through creative expression as a means for healing and/or activism.
- **Mediation** seeks to remedy conflict at the local and/or international level through the development and activation of communication channels between adversarial stakeholders.
- **Environment** pursues regional cooperation on the study and resolution of environmental issues which cut across border lines.
- **Language Instruction** promotes the study of language across national-ethnic divides for the sake of cultural literacy, personal welfare, and/or political partnership.
- **Sports** provide a space for connection across national divides through team-based sports to teach the values of cooperation and partnership.
- **NGO Support** aims to build the capacity of NGOs through strategic planning, financial advising, professional skills training and more.
- **Media** seeks to develop and promote content that advances mutual understanding across national divides and/or is supportive of peace and diplomacy. This work is also usually uninational, in some cases there are cross-border partnerships where the team is binational and coordinates together but mostly work inside their own communities.
- **Economic Empowerment** supports marginalized communities, helping them gain better economic opportunities through skill building, job placement, networking and other means.

## Organizational Profile Statistics: 2024

### Peacebuilding Approaches



## 4. Recommendations

**RECOMMENDATION #1: NGOs must operate with excellence and professionalism in order to succeed in achieving real impact. The donor community should demand that excellence and invest in it.<sup>26</sup>**

NGOs worldwide struggle with inefficiency, lack of capacity, minimal funding, and more. This is common knowledge. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, NGOs face additional challenges related to the cross-border nature of their work. We have found that NGOs that are strategic are often the most resilient. It is critical that NGO leadership invest in their capacity through adopting strategic thinking in order to become more effective. At Amal-Tikva, we seek to build capacity for sustainable and scalable peacebuilding efforts, and through our own monitoring and evaluation over the last four years we see that it works. At the same time, our data shows that NGOs investing in their capacity through strategic, impact-focused planning become more effective. We therefore propose that NGOs and donors adopt the same terminology around strategic thinking through monitoring and evaluation to enable the field to scale and be as effective as possible. NGOs should be wary of outsourcing their monitoring and evaluation to external parties, as the focus is often on making an NGO *look good* rather than helping the NGO *do its work well*.

**Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)** is an integral part of ensuring that NGOs and donors stay

<sup>26</sup> Our recommendation to donors from our 2020 report remain relevant.: "Donors should offer general support funding, or program funding for multiple years at a time, building on successes and taking risks to encourage innovation," from "The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding Efforts."

focused on impact, not on simply doing what feels or looks right in the moment. Monitoring is the regular collection and analysis of information or data about an organization and each of its projects. The purpose of monitoring work is to keep efforts on target and allow the NGO to track progress over time. Evaluation is a bird's eye view of various data collected over time, often in order to measure whether project activities have achieved overall objectives. If utilized as a goal to help the NGO learn how to most effectively achieve impact, then the organization, its donors, and its beneficiaries all stay focused on real change.

**Learn from mistakes.** Over the last four years, through 41 interviews and our own experience as members of the field, we have seen that many NGOs sometimes face crises on a scale that could shut them down. One NGO leader was duped into an insurance scam, leading employees to not have basic rights and access to healthcare. Another NGO leader missed several funding rounds she was invited to apply for and her organization was therefore in debt, due to miscommunication with donors and a lack of fundraising training. Yet another NGO leader thought that budgets were always created retroactively, after the year's funds had been raised and spent, and not in preparation for it. Even we at Amal-Tikva have found ourselves making bureaucratic mistakes in paperwork that require dozens of hours to correct. Everyone make mistakes, and therefore NGOs and donors, led by people, also make mistakes. The key to advancing impact despite errors is not to strive for perfection but to be a learning organization. Monitoring and evaluation are more than just tasks on an NGO's to-do list; they represent a culture of learning and striving for excellence within an NGO.

*The key to advancing impact despite errors is not to strive for perfection but to be a learning organization. Monitoring and evaluation are more than just tasks on an NGO's to-do list; they represent a culture of learning and striving for excellence within an NGO.*


We define strategy as making decisions that serve to further overall goals by channeling all efforts in the same direction. M&E is how civil society can create an ongoing feedback loop that enables stakeholders to continually refine strategies as the reality around them changes. M&E enables NGOs and donors to continually improve their work and ultimately facilitate the scaling needed to reach a critical mass and get a seat at the metaphoric leadership table.<sup>27</sup> The La Piana model, depicted below, conceptualizes strategy as a pyramid that makes monitoring and evaluation efforts feel more manageable.<sup>28</sup> This pyramid demonstrates that organizational strategy is at the top because everything else flows from it. Next is the programmatic strategy, followed by the operational strategy. When an organization is thinking strategically, it carefully considers each of the three levels of strategy and how they are interrelated.<sup>29</sup>

27 Strichman, N., & Rothbart, M. M. (2024). *Strategic Design for Social Initiatives*. Amal-Tikva.

28 La Piana, D. (2008). *The Nonprofit Strategy Revolution*. Fieldstone Alliance, St. Paul, Minnesota, p. 26.

29 La Piana, D. (2008), p. 26.

## The Strategy Pyramid (See La Piana, 2008)



Organizational strategy represents how an NGO defines its desired impact and intent to advance its mission.<sup>30</sup> Included here is the vision, mission, and values, as well as the context within which an NGO works, and its stakeholders – sometimes referred to as ‘organizational DNA.’ Programmatic strategy represents the work an NGO does in order to advance its mission in the most effective way.<sup>31</sup> Programmatic strategy signifies current thinking on which set of activities can best promote an organization’s goals. Keeping current program choices and activities as adaptable and flexible as possible allows NGOs to successfully carry out their mission and achieve desired impact as the reality around them changes. An organization is not defined by what it does, but by what it seeks to achieve.

Operational strategy refers to the way in which an NGO manages finances, staffing, administrative processes, facilities, and information technologies<sup>32</sup>. It addresses how an organization functions on a daily basis – how its infrastructure and systems support both organizational and programmatic strategies. It is important to periodically review the management of everyday functions. This can help to ensure that organizational and programmatic strategies are best supported by the existing organizational infrastructure.

One NGO’s success brings up the field. One donor’s mistake can bring down the whole dynamic between funders and programs. We must give each other support and the benefit of the doubt—not be in competition. There is a claim that collaboration needs to be something we do that makes donors or other external stakeholders happy because it reduces redundancy. Collaboration does not merely reduce redundancy, it actually sets a tone of excellence that reverberates fieldwide.

Donors can and should be holding NGOs to a higher standard of monitoring and evaluation than ever before, based on impact-driven results toward a shared theory of change rather than linked back to the two-state solution or any other end-game result. In order for civil society to effectively engage a critical mass, funders and NGOs need to share a common language focused on impact. This will enable civil society actors to develop the expertise needed to both build a more peaceful reality from the ground up, while being positioned to support top-down peacemaking.

**The goal of peacebuilding and peacemaking, for NGOs, activists, decision makers, and donors alike, is to enable each society to reach a place of wanting to live in a new nonviolent reality with the other side.** Staying goal-oriented and impact-focused will make sure that organizational

30 See Bryson, J. (2004). *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations* and La Piana, D. (2008).

31 See Bryson, J. (2004) and La Piana, D. (2008).

32 See Bryson, J. (2004) and La Piana, D. (2008).

decisions are made from that vantage point, and not for the sake of demonstrating that programs are happening.

**RECOMMENDATION #2: Civil society actors dedicated to peacebuilding should lean into their national and/or religious identities and seek to engage communities within their own societies, including those that have been marginalized by previous peacebuilding efforts.**

Years of program evaluation and research have proven that person-to-person peacebuilding is highly effective in changing attitudes and enhancing cooperation in ethnic and territorial conflicts around the world. Research confirms that these programs change attitudes that conflicting groups have about each other, establish deeply rooted cooperation, build new feelings of trust, and positively change people's views about peace. Participants in civil society peacebuilding programs exhibit much higher trust and willingness to work with the other side.

Yet while we have seen and noted above that peacebuilding programs that bring members from opposing sides of active conflict have proven to transform negatives and build trust, that does not mean joint programs are the only path to create positive change. Right now we, as members of civil society, must acknowledge that the reality is so violent and so polarized that engaging Israelis and Palestinians in dialogue or even basic-level encounters may not be the most effective way to encourage their openness toward a new nonviolent construct with the other side. There is no inherent value in dialogue for the sake of dialogue, or binational meetings for the sake of binational meetings. Donors and activists alike need to recognize this point. That being said, programs that do continue to engage Israelis and Palestinians together should make sure to include dialogue as a component to build trust and mutual understanding.

Uninational work, defined as engaging within one society within the framework of a peacebuilding-focused theory of change, can provide the safety and comfort for individuals to engage with deep questions and challenges related to peacebuilding without having to directly face the other. Some examples of uninational work include religious study on conflict transformation, nonviolent communication training, mediation training, women empowerment work, youth civic engagement, and more. These stakeholders play the essential role of providing legitimacy and support. We encourage NGOs to identify all relevant stakeholders and map how to most effectively reach key stakeholders within their specific approach.

*“Right now we, as members of civil society, must acknowledge that the reality is so violent and so polarized that engaging Israelis and Palestinians in dialogue or even basic-level encounters may not be the most effective way to encourage their openness toward a new nonviolent construct with the other side.”*

The Diamond Approach<sup>33</sup> is a visual representation of this suggestion. The diamond has four points: the top representing political/diplomatic “top-down” peacemaking, the bottom representing grassroots peacebuilding efforts, and the sides representing each side of the conflict, in this case, the Israeli and Palestinian societies. The dotted line in the middle is where the two societies meet, and the people holding that dotted line represent those doing the peacebuilding work. It is important that both at the top and bottom levels, the Israelis and Palestinians trying to create a more peaceful reality reach out into their own societies (represented by the arrows facing away from the center line) and then bring that insight back to the conversation in the center (represented by the arrows facing toward the center).

## Diamond Approach to Peacebuilding



The Diamond Approach acknowledges that most peacebuilders come from one side of the conflict. As outlined in the findings above, peacebuilding staff are just as affected by the violence of the conflict as their home communities. This means that Israeli and Palestinian civil society peacebuilders hold the complexity of their own narrative alongside the others, and therefore are the right liaisons to overcome the ethnocentric scope of each society’s vision in order to remain open-minded to creating a new nonviolent construct. As each side continues to become more polarized, the Diamond Approach encourages uninational engagement with the intention of sharing observations and developing approaches across national lines that will enable each society to see the development of a new nonviolent construct (explained below) from within their religious and national aspirations.

The value of peacebuilders being deeply situated within their own society is not only for the sake of recruiting conationalists to participate in joint programs but rather to a) examine each side’s nationalistic and religious aspirations from a peacebuilding perspective, and then to b) develop curricula within the following fields that will enable society to see that the most effective path toward realizing their religious and nationalistic aspirations is through a more peaceful reality, namely: Education, Environment, Healthcare, Religion, Academia, Justice, Economics/Finance, Public Broadcasting, Tourism, and more.

We mentioned previously that peacebuilding work is often criticized for preaching to the proverbial choir. Though several organizations have begun to challenge themselves to engage a wider target audience (as observed in Finding 4), the standard remains to work with populations that are ideologically proximate to the liberal pro-peace camp. The Diamond Approach encourages peacebuilders at the grassroots level (on the bottom of the diamond above) to continually engage more deeply within each society—Israeli peacebuilders engaging further inside Israeli society, with Palestinian peacebuilders engaging further inside Palestinian society. The dotted line in the middle represents a space for the Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilders to come back together through shared work to continue to discuss, build strategy, confer, and then re-engage.

At the NGO level, changes can be as simple as they are profound. From making programs

<sup>33</sup> Designed by Amal-Tikva, 2024.



religious—such as being mindful of dietary, holiday, and Sabbath restrictions—to offering male-only or female-only groups to accommodate modesty concerns. Simple changes in marketing language, as well as adjusting schedules and locations to meet religious needs or engage community members at different life stages, enables the more conservative groups within society to participate.

Civil society initiatives cannot end the war or create a nonviolent reality on their own. However, even if political elites succeed in creating a ceasefire, armistice agreement, or even peace treaty, the tensions between the two sides will remain so high that renewed war could break out at any moment. The role of civil society, therefore, is to systematically and strategically build a new reality over time that is better for both societies in the long term by working within each society to embed the value of nonviolence within their nationalistic and religious aspirations.

**RECOMMENDATION #3: Civil society peacebuilding should engage key actors, including religious/political decision makers, community leaders, and even spoilers.**

In the years immediately following the Oslo Accords, which initially enjoyed high levels of support among both Israelis and Palestinians, each society waited eagerly to experience the anticipated gains promised by their respective leaders. Unfortunately, the ensuing broken promises, rising violence, and the agreements' own inherent flaws resulted in the collapse of this brief moment of optimism. Oslo had arrived suddenly, almost magically, following secret negotiations whose success surprised even the most well-informed and politically engaged citizens. With almost no civic preparation for even the idea of peace, let alone the compromises the agreement entailed, it is not surprising in retrospect that the agreements collapsed; what is surprising is that it took several years to do so. The cynicism and fatalism that replaced the initial euphoria proved more detrimental than the prior reality, exacerbating tensions tenfold and leading to the Second Intifada, one of the most violent periods in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This intense violence led to institutionalized separation, compounding the psychological distance that such horrendous violence had already created.

Reckoning with the failed legacy of Oslo demands assessing how the peace process alienated illiberal populations in both societies which later became the respective symbols of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. The analyst Ofer Zalberg explains that tying up liberal, international-law focused peacemaking efforts with broader liberal/democratic political goals leads illiberal

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constituencies into opposing peace and anything associated with it, even if they would actually support the ultimate goal of peace if it were expressed as within their values system<sup>34</sup>. While peace processes over the last 30 years have continually excluded certain key actors and effectively positioned them as spoilers, it is those spoilers who since the Second Intifada have transformed the status quo altogether—from pursuing peace accords to entrenching irredentist claims.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the two national communities have become increasingly skeptical and antagonistic toward the possibility of a nonviolent resolution to the conflict. On the Israeli side, a recent Pew study from May 2024 shows that only 26% of Israelis think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully. On the Palestinian side, a September 6, 2023 public opinion poll<sup>35</sup> showed that 53% of Palestinians believed that the best way to end the occupation and establish an independent state of Palestine is armed struggle and 58% supported armed confrontations and intifada in order to break the deadlock.

This is precisely why it is not sufficient for peacebuilding work to engage those already supportive of peaceful coexistence. Civil society must instead work to engage the illiberal factions within their societies to understand that a new nonviolent construct is in fact the most effective way to realize their religious and nationalistic aspirations. Because the spoilers of the peace process became so influential, changing the current reality toward peacebuilding can only happen *with them*. Only by engaging key actors—even the most extreme actors—and demonstrating that each side’s religious and national aspirations cannot be achieved through the current violent reality can peacebuilders reach deeply enough inside their own societies to change the intractable nature of the conflict and move toward a nonviolent political horizon.

**NGOs should focus on engaging the key actors relevant to their focus area and approach to peacebuilding.** For instance, the key actors engaged in educational programs may be specific school systems, certain ministry of education players, or municipal leaders who oversee educational materials. For mediators, key actors may include religious leaders of extreme movements including those at the helm of militant groups. On the other hand, some NGOs can be (and are) advisors or inside mediators at the highest levels of government, supporting real-time negotiations to de-escalate violence. Naturally, for NGOs to be taken seriously by any key leaders, they must operate with a nuanced perspective that decision-makers will find indispensable. “NGOs can help find new and creative ways to reconceptualize conflicts and suggest possibilities for conflict intervention outside of the normal paradigms utilized by governments and official bodies.”<sup>36</sup>

We have seen this method succeed in other conflict zones. For example, in the mid-1980s, just a few years before the Oslo Accords, violent attacks were a daily occurrence in Northern Ireland, as tensions boiled over between the Nationalist and Unionist populations. Their respective leaders refused to meet under any circumstance, let alone entertain the notion of a peace agreement that seemed all but impossible. Seeing few of the preconditions necessary for peace, the United States government and international partners decided to intervene at an unprecedented level in order to disrupt and rearrange key civil society variables. That intervention, the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), helped to create the social, economic, and political foundations—what we call “social peace”—upon which a political agreement was secured more than a decade later by investing in civil society peacebuilding at a far-reaching scale. UK Chief Negotiator Jonathan Powell called IFI “the great unsung hero of the peace process,” and it continues to receive credit for nurturing a culture

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34 Ofer, Zalberg. 2019. “Beyond Liberal Peacemaking: Lessons from Israeli-Palestinian Diplomatic Peacemaking.” *Review of Middle East Studies* 53 (1).

35 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. (2023). [Public Opinion Poll No (89)]. Retrieved from <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/955>

36 “Reframing the Problem: An Approach to the Kurdish Question in Turkey,” in *NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict*, ed. Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 160.



of peace that has been sustained and strengthened despite significant political crises since 1998.

*Without work aimed at developing community, and the development of some new community leadership, it would have been impossible to shift the party political landscape. While the military containment of the paramilitaries was vital, without work that ensured a less contentious interface with the security forces, particularly on the part of the Nationalists communities, such contention would have assisted the continuance of violence. Without work aimed at validating cultural diversity, communities would have feared and distrusted community relations work, and seen it as an attempt at removing rather than respecting differences. Without community relations work, it would have been impossible to address the issues of justice and political choices between the communities. And without community development work, which increased the confidence of communities to address their differences, we would have lacked the addition of new political leaders from the communities who were eventually to help transform the political process and make the Agreement possible.<sup>37</sup>*

In order for international investment in Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding to reach the scale that IFI invested in Northern Ireland, donors would need to invest hundreds of millions of dollars over the next ten years. The US government has taken the first step toward this path by adopting the Nita Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA). In order to help bring NGOs to that level, resources and strategic efforts need to be well-funded and well-coordinated between donors, activists, NGOs, and academics alike. The US government has a serious role to play by utilizing MEPPA to invest in strengthening civil society's capacities to engage all segments of both societies from the top-down to the bottom-up most effectively. They can do this by funding for scale and encouraging local leadership to stay committed for the long term.

- **Bridge theory with practice.** Academic-practitioner networks should analyze civil society peacebuilding efforts worldwide, identify best practices, and provide a laboratory to experiment with implementation. Seed funding should support new projects and require accompaniment via training and regular meetings with consultants as well as program and support staff. Projects should be guided through establishment from the theory of change level, program design, monitoring and evaluation, as well as institutional infrastructure at the operational, financial, and legal levels. Ideally, new programs funded through such a laboratory would become eligible in succeeding years to apply for funding via other funding mechanisms, and should also be required to establish income-generating models to assure a degree of independent financial sustainability.
- **Encourage startups, businesses, and economic partnerships for peace in addition to NGOs.** Donors interested in furthering economic sustainability between Israelis and Palestinians may be interested in economic and human investments that support reconciliation and peace, and many projects will touch on both aspects. Impact investments and microgrants could enable investing in organizations and initiatives focused on peacebuilding with the intention to generate social impact alongside a financial return. This could then include startup and business ventures that promote social peace, or income-generating programs inside not-for-profit entities that encourage financial sustainability for the organizations themselves, as well as for the peacebuilding funding program.
- **Fund for scale.** Donors should support core/operating costs to support organizational infrastructure offered over multiple years, with opportunities for renewal. As organizations

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<sup>37</sup> NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict, ed. Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp. 173-175.

scale and their core funding needs grow to support their expansion, the percent per budget of the core funding grants should decrease annually, although the gifts do not have to. This encourages financial sustainability for the organization without cutting NGOs off from receiving donations after a certain number of years. For example, if an organization with a \$2.5 million dollar per year budget receives a \$2 million grant over two years, the intent would be that the organization grows overall so that in year one the \$1 million may be 40% of the overall budget, yet by year two the organization will have grown and the \$1 million granted in the second year will at that point be only 30% of the organizational budget. While core funding grants should not necessarily require such dramatic budget growth from year to year, it can surely measure these incremental increases as one of its indicators of success.

- **Invest in peace leaders.** Civil society organizational leaders have been scrambling to raise sufficient funds and manage complex logistical realities, leaving little time to match rhetorical ambition with a sound theory of change and scalable model that can generate measurable societal impact. Those doing the work in the region are most often local activists joining the field from a place of religious or political ideology, and often trauma.<sup>38</sup> Creating professional, strategic leadership requires investment. This can be done through unique grants, which fund an individual's salary for a multi-year period to keep them in the field, and can require participation by that individual in a serious professional development, dialogue and/or adaptive leadership training programs. Investment in local leaders would incentivize them to stay in the field, and provide a holistic support network within which to grow and learn, therefore encouraging a culture of breeding future leaders in the field at large.

#### **RECOMMENDATION #4: Civil society peacemaking efforts should change the public discourse on the conflict.**

As the world remains preoccupied with the ongoing Israel-Gaza war, we are witnessing the radicalization of public discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at home and abroad. The return of the global spotlight on our conflict has only reflected and amplified the vitriolic discourse playing out in Israeli and Palestinian societies. We believe there is a great need to offer an alternative discourse which focuses on constructive change toward building a horizon for diplomatic agreements. We acknowledge that diplomatic resolution to the conflict ostensibly remains distant and cynicism is a sensible response to such a dire crisis. Nevertheless, we do not succumb to the fatalism and triumphalism that dominate the Israeli-Palestinian conversation because we understand the critical role civil society can play in transforming the conflict. At Amal-Tikva, we have been working to establish the infrastructure that will enable the aspiration of peacebuilding to become a field of sustainable and scalable social change. We have identified the root cause of the field's limited impact as a lack of common language around what peacebuilding means and what role civil society plays. The root cause of toxic and counterproductive discourse around the conflict stems from a similar source: People don't know what positive change can look like. Just as we seek to change the way activists relate to peacebuilding—from protest movements focused on rallying large turnouts to social change focused on scaling measurable impact—we want to change the way peacebuilding is understood in global discourse on the conflict.

We define 'peacebuilding' as working to create a more peaceful reality for Palestinians and Israelis, characterized by less hatred, tension, and violence, an increased quality of life, and improved systems for interaction. Peacebuilding, we believe, is not equal to jumpstarting negotiations summits. Its aim is not merely the moment in which armistice agreements are signed, rather it refers to long-term processes by which warring societies adopt nonviolence as the means to achieving their national goals. Defined as such, peacebuilding becomes the lot not only of political elites but also of ordinary civilians leading social change efforts.


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38 "The State of Cross-Border Peacebuilding Efforts." *Amal-Tikva*, 2020 [www.amal-tikva.org/report](http://www.amal-tikva.org/report).

Unfortunately, whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seen unsustainable periods of relative calm throughout history, the lower levels of violence in these chapters were not the fruit of non-violent ideology or a political solution. These periods of calm have always been enforced by the threat of intense violence and the status quo has always unequally and relatively maintained personal security. While the absence of large-scale violence is always more desirable than the state of war, the dynamic of fear and intimidation upholding such nonviolent standards is not sustainable. In order to create a more sustainable status quo of nonviolence, there must be a value of nonviolence rooted in the nationalistic and religious aspirations of each side in support of a new nonviolent construct.

We understand that the adoption of the value of nonviolence in both societies is a matter of generational change. In light of this, we believe that the following framework for building the new reality over time is one to keep in mind as we work toward measured scalable impact.

### The Path to a New Nonviolent Construct



#### Reality of Violence

- *Reality of Violence:* The reality of violence refers to a dynamic in which Israelis and Palestinians are in a state of active violent conflict. As noted in the chart above, there are always elements in the dynamic where there is an absence of violence at certain times and places, such as in shared public spaces and workplaces. The insight here is that until nonviolence is the dominant reality, it is not sustainable.

#### Nonviolence under the Threat of Violence

- *Nonviolence under the threat of violence:* This concept refers to a state where there is constant attempted violence across the two sides which is mitigated only by police and military forces, physical and geo-political barriers, and/or fear of repercussions. This form of nonviolence is dependent on the success of external forces keeping the aggressors unable to succeed in committing acts of violence and therefore encourages aggressors to continue to pursue violent means to improve their methods. This state is unsustainable unless deep work is being done to bring about a status quo of nonviolence.

#### Status Quo of Nonviolence

- *Status quo of nonviolence:* This concept refers to a state where the threat of violence has been relatively successful at maintaining a sense of normalcy in which both sides are relatively safe from regular violence. Each side settles into a mindset that they are generally safe in their day-to-day, but know that the balance between a nonviolent reality and a violent reality can shift at any moment. This state

Value  
of Nonviolence

is not sustainable unless deep work is being done to bring about a value of nonviolence.

- *Value of nonviolence:* This concept refers to a state of nonviolence in which each side of the conflict has internalized and declared that the best way for their religious and nationalistic ideologies to be realized is through the development of a nonviolent construct with the other residents of the land. This model assumes that a) trust and mutual understanding will never be enough on their own, and b) nonviolence for the sake of individual interests will never be a sustainable framework. While trust, understanding, and individual interests are important elements that can create a status quo of nonviolence, that status quo will remain unstable until the illiberal actors who have become the spoilers on each side of the conflict are transformed into the key actors driving the new peaceful construct from within each side's religious and national identity.

New  
Nonviolent  
Construct

- *New nonviolent construct:* The reality of nonviolence refers to a dynamic in which Israelis and Palestinians are in a state of relative peace. As noted in the chart above, there are always elements in the dynamic where there is violence as well, and that needs to be an assumption built-in to the new non-violent construct with risks appropriately mitigated and addressed. The understanding here is that until nonviolence is the majority of the reality and rooted in the values of the religious and nationalistic aspirations, it is not sustainable.

←  
Danger of Regression

- *Danger of regression:* The danger of regression acknowledges that national conflict is never fully in the past, and the work of peacebuilding will always continue. The steps toward a new nonviolent construct are not linear, but rather demand constituent, long-term moves that meet different sectors of society at different stages. As seen in conflicts around the world throughout history, the post-conflict reconciliation work within each society and between the sides remains critical indefinitely.

## 5. CONCLUSION

It is a complicated task to write a report about the state of the field of civil society peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians at a time when we have never felt farther from peace. We have long understood that it was not enough to just bring people together, to run random programs, or to keep operating merely for the sake of operating. At the same time, we know that wars are fought by armies through their might and treaties are made by political leaders with their power, but neither of these alone will bring about real peace.

Since October 7, 2023 and the start of the war in Gaza, Amal-Tikva has had the opportunity to not only engage the NGOs interviewed in this report, but also to work on an individual level with dozens of NGOs, donors, diplomats, academics and activists. The resilience in the field we had

been sensing through engagement in our programs was more than validated by the data outlined above, and by the reactions to this data by key stakeholders who had the opportunity to review this report before its publishing.

Diplomatic efforts at advancing a framework for peace will have to confront the gaping rift between Palestinian and Israeli perceptions of the war, including divergent narratives of what did and did not happen on October 7, and will need civil society's help in doing so. Polls undertaken six months into the war demonstrate that a vast majority of Palestinians (71%) believe that " Hamas' decision to launch the October the 7th offensive" was correct and that nearly all Palestinians (94%) think Israel has committed war crimes<sup>39</sup>. By contrast, only 11% of Israelis believe that Israel does not do enough to protect civilians in Gaza and 81% believe that Israel should continue fighting the war even at the price of deepening international isolation. These are the conditions under which the peacebuilding NGOs surveyed in this report seek to make a difference.<sup>40</sup>

While NGOs struggle to create change amid an actively violent war, they also suffer from the most common challenges facing non-profit work worldwide. The staff of these NGOs, the ones waking up each day to bring civil society closer to wanting a better reality, are Israelis and Palestinians themselves, suffering from loss, fear, devastation, and confusion. The odds are against those partaking in the work and yet we have seen in the data and through watching NGOs in our programs scale over the last four years that **becoming strategic is the path toward resilience and maximum effectiveness**.

Research has proven that peacebuilding programs change attitudes that conflicting groups hold about each other, establish deeply rooted cooperation, build new feelings of trust, and positively change people's views about peace. Moreover, participants in civil society peacebuilding programs exhibit much higher trust and willingness to work with the other side<sup>41</sup>. Unfortunately, the potential for transformational impact of civil society peacebuilding efforts is restrained by structural challenges – such as the institutionalized separation between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, socio-economic inequality, and linguistic divides – as well as by the lack of capacity and resources possessed by organizations seeking to bring these two sides together. To date, even the most strategic organizations with the most effective models have made a minimal impact, yet we see the possibility for that to change.

*While this presents the needs for NGOs to develop policy making skills, capacity, and expertise in order to be respected and effective in the formal policy making process, some critics may see these qualities as incongruous with the unique NGO characteristics of informality, spontaneity, and flexibility. Nevertheless, if NGOs are to be valuable contributors to the formal policy process, more formalized techniques must be used to work effectively within the established system.*<sup>42</sup>

And there are signs of encouragement. At the time of writing this report, the G7 Heads of Government met in Italy for their annual summit and prioritized civil society peacebuilding as a critical component of any diplomatic resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "We affirm our commitment to working together – and with other international partners – to closely coordinate and institutionalize our support for civil society peacebuilding efforts, ensuring that they are

39 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), "Public Opinion Poll No (91)," April 15, 2024. <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/973>

40 "Most Israelis want Rafah operation despite US - survey," Globes. March 7, 2024. <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-most-israelis-want-rafah-operation-despite-us-survey-1001473877>

41 Lazarus, N., & Ross, K, "Tracing the Long-Term Impacts of a Generation of Israeli-Palestinian Encounters." *International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution* (2015), 3(2). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26928690>

42 "Stepping Up to the Table: NGO Strategies for Influencing Policy on Conflict Issues," in *NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict*, ed. Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p.13.



part of a larger strategy to build the foundation necessary for a negotiated and lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.”<sup>43</sup>

This announcement followed a letter sent to the G7 leaders from over 160 civil society leaders, spearheaded by the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP)<sup>44</sup>. While ALLMEP has been encouraging NGOs to engage at the diplomatic and political level through regular advocacy opportunities to encourage wide scale funding for the field, this particular initiative seems to indicate that civil society does not just seek funds but also a seat at the table. The letter’s demand to bring NGOs to the table seems to have been acknowledged as a helpful suggestion by the G7, and can be the missing ingredient for influencing policies that will create a more sustainable nonviolent reality. As the Honorable George R. Salem, the inaugural Board Chair of the MEPPA Advisory Board, stated in the most recent public board meeting:

*This is a moment of tremendous loss and grief, but there is almost a glimmer of hope that something better might emerge out of the destruction and death we have seen... There is energy and innovation in the peacebuilding and business communities that MEPPA supports, and we need to protect and preserve their ability to operate in this chaotic and violent period, so they are ready to surge forward when the time is right.*<sup>45</sup>

Each type of actor must know its role, while coordinating efforts across roles. Just as NGOs cannot end the war, political leaders of narrow ideological camps cannot reach the deepest factions of society to inspire a more nuanced way of thinking about their realities. Just as journalists do not have the time to dedicate years of deep research for one particular article, academics do not necessarily have the platforms to translate their research and learning into accessible mediums that reach mass audiences. Peace requires not just an agreement on paper, but momentum toward broad societal change: change that entails internal rehabilitation in both societies, transition from pain and vengefulness to tolerance and compromise, and an eventual relationship-building across national divides. If each actor knows its role, becomes aware of the roles of the other actors, and coordinates strategically toward a shared goal, then change toward a better reality within the context of a new nonviolent construct will not only be attainable, but will be desirable among Israeli and Palestinian societies at large.

*Peace requires not just an agreement on paper, but momentum toward broad societal change: change that entails internal rehabilitation in both societies, transition from pain and vengefulness to tolerance and compromise, and an eventual relationship-building across national divides.*

43 G7. (2017). G7 Leaders’ Communique. *G7 Italy*. Retrieved June 16, 2024, from <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>

44 Alliance for Middle East Peace. "Call to Action from Over 350 Organizations to the G7." June 3, 2024. <https://www.allmep.org/news/call-to-action-from-over-350-organizations-to-the-g7/>.

45 U.S. Agency for International Development. "Transcript: Partnership for Peace Fund Advisory Board Meeting, May 21, 2024." USAID, 21 May 2024, <https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/speeches/may-21-2024-transcript-partnership-peace-fund-advisory-board-meeting-may-21-2024>.

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